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January 23, 1981 Conference
Supplemental List
No. 80-5303

BELTRAN

Motion of Petitioner for
Summary Reversal and Remand
in Part

v.
MYERS
SUMMARY:

CA 9
On Nov. 3, the Court granted cert limited to the

question of whether California's application of a transfer of assets
rule to its medically needy aged, blind, and disabled applicants for
Medicaid, resulting in the denial of assistance to individuals otherwise eligible, contradicts the applicable portions of the Social
Security Act and thus violates the Supremacy Clause.

On Dec. 23,

the President signed legislation that will explicitly permit states
to employ a transfer of assets rule to applicants for Medicaid.
Petr seeks summary reversal and remand on the ground that the new
legislation confirms that Calif.'s application of a transfer of assets
rule was contrary to existing legislation.

-

BACKGROUND:

2 -

Title XIX of the Social Security Act established

the Medicaid program, a cooperative federal-state program to provide
medical assistance to certain classes of people.

States are not

required to participate; if they do, they must develop plans that
conform to the federal guidelines.

The states must provide assist-

ance to "categorically needy" individuals, that is, ryrsons receiving
certain enumerated kinds of assistance (such as Supplemental Security
Income (SSI)).
The states apparently have some discretion in determining how
"medically needy" individuals are covered.

These are individuals

who become needy because of medical expenses.

At issue is whether

Calif. may apply a transfer of assets (TOA) rule to these individuals.
The TOA rule can operate to prevent a person from qualifying as
"medically needy" if within two years of the application he has
transferred assets for less than full consideration.
v

The rule raises

a presumption that the transfer was made to enable the applicant to
qualify for aid.
Under federal law the TOA rule may not be utilized in determining
eligibility for SSI payments and hence may not be applied to
"categorically needy" individuals.

The petr, the responsible federal

agency and most courts hold that the federal statutes and regulations
iltrJ

do not permit the application of a more stringent criteri~ to "medicall
needy" individuals than to "categorically needy" persons.

Calif. and

the CA 9 disagree.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the legislation enacted Dec. 28,

by permitting use of TOA rules in determining eligibility

for both

SSI and Medicaid assistance, confirms petr's contention that

TOA

rule was contrary to existing federal legislation.

Calif.'•

Petr arguee

-

3 -

that the legislation was explicitly intended to change a perceived
inadequacy in the existing statutes:

namely, that a person could

meet the financial eligibility requirement for SSI by disposing of
his assets.

Since Calif. 's TOA rule does not allow this, petr con-

eludes that it is contrary to the federal statutes.
Petr argues that in light of the explicit congressional recognition of present federal law, the Court should summarily reverse and
remand .

Petr also suggests that as to applicants after the effective

date of the new legislation, July 1 , 1981, the lower courts' decisions
should be vacated and the matter remanded for consideration of Calif .' s

~

TOA rule under the new legislation (possibly with a new class repre-

sentative).
Resp in its brief argues that the use of subsequent legislative

c

history to interpret the statute is of dubious value.

Resp argues

that this Court has recognized that pronouncements by a subsequent
Congress are not entitled to the same weight as those of the Congress
that enacted a measure.

Furthermore, resp points out that the Senate

Finance Committee in its explanation of the subsequently enacted bill
stated that its recognition of the existence of court opinions adopting petr's position should not be construed as agreement with the
opinions.

Finally resp argues that the new legislation , in adopting

Calif. ' s approach, suggests the greater wisdom of Calif .' s policy .
DISCUSSION:

I

Rega r dless of the ultimate merits of petr ' s case ,

it does not lend itself to summary treatment.

Petr ' s argument that

the existing laws prohibited the use of TOA rules in the eligibility
standard for " medically needy" depends
with which the CA 9 disagreed .

on an analysis of the statutes,

Similarly petr' s use of the new legis-

lation to support her position also relies on an analysis of the n ew

-

statutes.

4 -

The new statutes do not expressly support petr ' s position

and a determination of Congress's intent is complicated by two factors.
First, the new legislation specifically changed the rules for SSI
eligibility .

In light of this change, it is difficult to determine

whether Congress addressed the particular problem of the standard
for "medically needy".

Second, Congress may be motivated by a conclu-

sion that an existing practice is questionable rather than that it is
illegal.
Petr has not carried her burden of demonstrating that the CA 9
was so clearly wrong as to allow summary reversal.
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